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JURISDICTION
Appellant asserts jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5,
Utah Constitution, and 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended)•
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case involves claims by both Okland Construction Company,
Inc. ("Okland") and A.J. Mackay Company ("Mackay") against each
other relative to a public highway construction project. Mackayfs
appeal is from an Order of the District Court granting Okland!s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing Mackay's Complaint
and

denying

Mackay's

Motion

for Summary

Judgment

to compel

arbitration and to dismiss Okland's Counterclaims.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
1.
Comply

Was Mackay's Complaint Properly Dismissed for Failure to
with

the Notice

Requirements

and

Provisions

of the

Subcontracts with Okland ?
2.

Was Mackayfs Complaint Properly Dismissed for Failure to

Allege that Mackay was Properly Licensed as a Contractor When the
Contracts Were Entered Into and When the Claims Arose as Required
by the Utah Contractors Licensing Act ?
3.

Was Mackayfs Complaint Properly Dismissed Based Upon

Mackay1s Failure to Obtain a Contractors License as Required by
the Utah Contractors Licensing Act ?
1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ETC,
The following statutes and regulations are determinative of
the issues on appeal and are set forth below pursuant to Rule
24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Utah Code Ann., Section 58-50-11 (1953 as amended)1:
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain
any action in any Court of the State for collection of
compensation for the performance of any act for which a
license is required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed contractor when
the contract sued upon was entered into and when the
alleged cause of action arose.
Section 107(c), Rules and Regulations of the Utah Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing;
Creation of a corporation creates a new legal person
which requires a new license even though one or more
stockholders have a contractor's license. A license held
by a stockholder cannot be authority to the corporation
to engage in contracting.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mackay's Statement of the Case contains numerous factual
statements which are inaccurate and without any reference to the
record or source of admissible evidence and which are unsupported

1

This provision was first enacted in 1981 and has since been
included under various versions of the Utah Contractors Licensing
Act since that time. It has been known as 58A-la-13; 58-50-11; and
currently as 58-55-17. When this action was filed in December of
1988, the provision was known as Section 58-50-11 and, therefore,
will be referred in this brief under that designation.
2

by

the record.

All

such allegations,

therefore, should be

disregarded by the Court. Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. .
588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978); Dirks v. Cornwell. 754 P.2d 946 (Utah
App. 1988).
Nature of the Case
This case involves contracts between Okland and Mackay on a
public highway construction project known as Utah Department of
Transportation

project

Number

1-215-9(72)10,

West

of

Little

Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East (the "Project") . Okland was
the general contractor on the Project under contract with the Utah
Department

of

Transportation

("UDOT").

Okland

entered

into

subcontracts with Mackay for certain portions of the work.
Subsequent to completion of the Project, Mackay submitted
claims through Okland to UDOT for "extras" and, over a period of
several years, participated in negotiations with UDOT concerning
such claims. (R. 99-100; Mackay Brief, p. 3).

At the time of

completion of the project, Okland paid to Mackay all retention
funds and amounts due and did not withhold any amounts from Mackay
under its agreements on the Project.

(R. 100). Mackayfs claims

involve alleged "extra" work due to site conditions differing from
the plans and specifications prepared by UDOT.

(R. 100). Mackay

did not notify Okland of any claims not passing through to UDOT

3

until this action was filed four years after the project was
finished.

(R. 101).

Additionally, UDOT has withheld from Okland from Okland as
liquidated damages on the Project, $48,600 due to the failure of
Mackay to timely complete its work. Okland's Counterclaim against
Mackay seeks recovery of the amounts withheld by UDOT from Okland
as a result of Mackay's failure to prosecute the work in a diligent
and workmanlike manner.

(R. 9-16).

Okland has sought, for over four years, the cooperation of
Mackay in pursuing Mackay's claims against UDOT. (R. 100).

The

negotiations between Mackay, UDOT and Okland, however, have not
been

concluded

documentation

because

Okland

and

UDOT

are

waiting

for

and responses regarding UDOT concerns regarding

Mackay's claims, including primarily concerns that Mackay failed
to adequately man and equip its work forces and to perform the work
in an efficient manner. (R. 99-101).

Mackay has not provided any

response or documentation regarding the concerns of UDOT and Okland
concerning Mackay's claims despite repeated requests over a period
of more than four years. (R. 99-100).
Mackay subsequently sought to arbitrate the subject claims but
Okland refused because UDOT, as the party liable for such claims,
was

an

indispensable

party

and

UDOT

refused

to

submit

to

arbitration. (R. 2, 99). On December 23, 1988, Mackay filed this
4

action seeking arbitration and "payment for certain work performed
by Plaintiff..."

(R. 2; Mackay's Brief, page 6, paragraph 13).

On January 13, 1989, Okland filed its Answer and Counterclaim
against Mackay seeking damages resulting from, without limitation,
Mackay's negligence in performing the work and failure to prosecute
the work in a prompt and diligent manner. (R. 9-16).
Course of Proceedings and Disposition by Trial Court
On January 26, 1989, Okland filed its Motion for Partial
Summary

Judgment

seeking dismissal

of Mackay's Complaint

for

failure to comply with the Contractors Licensing Act and for
failure to satisfy contractual conditions precedent to suit. (R.
17-18).

Mackay subsequently filed its Motion to Dismiss the

Counterclaim of Okland on January 30, 1989. (R. 45). On February
7, 1989, Mackay filed another Motion for Summary Judgment to Compel
Arbitration.

(R. 52-53).

All of these Motions were heard in the

District Court on March 13, 1989, after numerous memoranda and
filings by the parties. (R. 139). On March 29, 1989, the District
Court

entered

its Order

Mackay's Complaint.

granting

Okland's

Motion

dismissing

The Order denied Mackay's Motion for Summary

Judgment to Compel Arbitration and Motion to Dismiss Okland's
Counterclaims.

(R. 139-40).

5

On April 26, 1989, Mackay filed its Notice of Appeal from the
Order entered by the District Court on March 29, 1989, which
dismissed the Complaint and denied Mackay's motions regarding
Okland's Counterclaim.

(R. 148).
UNDISPUTED FACTS

Facts Presented to District Court
1.

On or about February 1, 1984, plaintiff A. J. Mackay

Company

("Mackay"), as subcontractor, entered into subcontract

agreements with Okland, as general contractor, relating to Utah
Department of Transportation project number 1-215-9(72)10, West of
Little Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East.
2.
seeking

(R. 2, 36).

On or about December 23, 1988, Mackay filed its Complaint
arbitration

and

for payment

for

certain

extra

work

allegedly performed by plaintiff beyond the scope of the above
agreements. (R. 2, 36; Mackay Brief, p. 6, paragraph 13, p. 8).
3.
following

The agreements between Okland and Mackay contain the
provisions

relative

to

Mackay's

claims

concerning

Okland's performance:
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance
of any work under this contract depend wholly or
partially upon the proper workmanlike or accurate
performance of any work or materials furnished by the
Contractor or other subcontractors on the project, the
Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to
discover any such defects and report the same in writing
to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which
is so dependant; and shall allow to the Contractor a
reasonable time in which to remedy such defects; and in
6

the event he does not so report to the Contractor in
writing, then it shall be assumed that the Subcontractor
has fully accepted the work of others as being
satisfactory...
(R. 30-32)(Emphasis Added).
4.

The agreements between Okland and Mackay contain the

following provision requiring timely written notice claims for
extra work:
...any changes made in the amount of work involved, or
any other parts of this agreement, shall be by a written
amendment hereto setting forth in detail the changes
involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually
agreed upon between the Contractor and the Subcontractor
if such be possible; and if such mutual agreement is not
possible, then the value of the work shall be determined
as provided in Section 7 of this agreement.
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional
work outside the scope of this contract unless terms
hereof shall be conclusive with respect of this agreement
between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall
be made within one week from date of completion.
(R. 30-32).
5.

Mackay did not provide any written notice of alleged

deficiencies in Okland^ work impacting the work of Mackay and did
not give written notice of additional or extra work within one week
of completion of the work.

No written addendum to the agreements

exist relative to the claims of Mackay. (R. 38, 100).
6.

The Complaint of Mackay does not allege that A.J. Mackay

Company was licenced as a contractor in the State of Utah when the
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged cause of

7

action arose.
7.

(R. 2-5).

A. J. Mackay Company was not licensed as a contractor

within the State of Utah when the contract sued upon was entered
into and when the alleged cause of action arose. (R. 40)
8. The subcontracts upon which Mackay sues were entered into
on February 1, 1984, and the work thereunder was completed in
November of 1984. (R. 36, 98).
contractor until May 1, 1985.

Mackay was not licensed as a

(R. 40).

9. Okland has paid to Mackay all retention funds and amounts
due and has not withheld

any amounts

agreements on the Project.

(R. 100).

from Mackay under its

10. Mackay submitted claims, after completion of the project,
to UDOT for "extras" through Okland and, over a period of several
years, participated

in negotiations with UDOT concerning such

claims. (R. 99-100; Mackay Brief, p. 3).
11.

All claims of Mackay against Okland are based upon acts

of the Utah State Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), and not
of Okland, and all such claims pass through to UDOT and would be
the subject of third-party claims by Okland against UDOT. (R. 37) .
12.

UDOT has withheld $48,600.00 from Okland as liquidated

damages on the Project due to failure of Mackay to timely complete
its work.

Okland!s Counterclaim against Mackay seeks recovery of

the amounts withheld by UDOT from Okland as a result of Mackayfs
8

failure to prosecute the work in a diligent and workmanlike manner.
(R. 9-16).
Response to Mackay's Statement of Facts
Mackay sets forth in its Statement of Facts, and throughout
its Brief, numerous alleged facts without any reference to the
record or any source of admissible evidence as required by Rule
24(e) of this Court.

All such allegations, therefore, should be

disregarded by the Court. Uckerman v. Lincoln Natfl Life Ins. Co.,
588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978).

Additionally, a significant number of

Mackay's Statement of Facts are not found at all in the record, or
are otherwise inaccurate.
1. Mackay inaccurately suggests, throughout its Statement of
Facts, particularly paragraphs 1 through 10, that it was properly
licensed when the subject contracts were entered into and during
the Project.

The contracts were entered into on February 1, 1984

and all work on the Project was completed by November of 1984. (R.
36,

98).

The

certificate

from

the Utah

State

Division of

Professional Licensing confirms that plaintiff A.J. Mackay Company
was not licensed until May 31, 1985. (R. 40).
Mackay contends that a partnership, A.J. Mackay & Sons, was
formed sometime in 1979 and that at some later date the partnership
was

replaced

with a corporation, A. J.

9

Mackay

Company, the

plaintiff in this action, and further, that failure of A. J, Mackay
Company to obtain a license until 1985 was a mere oversight.

The

partnership, A.J. Mackay & Sons was formed sometime in 1979. (R.
50).

The corporation, A.J. Mackay Company, was also incorporated

on February 1, 1979. (R. 97). However, the plaintiff corporation,
A.J. Mackay Company, did not obtain a contractors license until six
years after incorporation.

(R. 40, 50). Mackay's assertion not

only ignores the undisputed facts in this matter, but also ignores
the legal distinction between partnerships and corporations as
separate and independent entities, which is discussed

in the

Argument below.
2.

Mackay's assertion in paragraph 2 of its Statement of

Facts, that the corporation A.J. Mackay Company operated with the
same personnel as the partnership A.J. Mackay & Sons is unsupported
by the record.

Mackay refers to pages 50 and 111 of the record.

No reference, however, is found in those portions of the record,
or elsewhere, as to the personnel of the two entities.
3.

Paragraph 3 of Mackay's Statement of Facts is entirely

unsupported by the record cited by Mackay. Mackay refers to pages
111 and 112 of the record for its assertion that the partnership
was licensed prior to incorporation of the plaintiff Mackay and
that financial responsibility and technical qualifications were met
by the corporation.

No such reference is found in the record.
10

In

fact, the license of A.J. Mackay & Sons upon which the plaintiff
corporation relies was issued at a time when no qualifier or
written examination was required for a contractors license. See
Certificate of Utah State Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing in the Addendum.
4. Mackay inaccurately states in paragraph 7 of its Statement
of Facts that when Mackay was licensed
qualifications were required

in 1985, no special

and misrepresents

that the same

license bearing the same license number was renewed.

No reference

is found in the record, or elsewhere, to qualifications required
in 1985 or the license numbers involved.

The license obtained by

the plaintiff corporation in 1985 is license No. 39131-5 in 1985.
(R. 40). The license of the partnership, A.J. Mackay & Sons, is
license No. 68049.

These are two separate licenses bearing

different license numbers for two independent entities.

Okland

submits herewith, in the Addendum, the certificate of the Utah
Division of Professional Licensing which clearly states that the
license of A.J. Mackay & Sons was a different license with a
different license number.

This certificate, although not part of

the record, is submitted for clarification purposes and to reduce
any prejudice resulting from Mackay's misstatement of the record.
5.

In paragraph 10 of the Statement of Facts, Mackay alleges

that it was licensed to perform construction services under the
11

name A.J. Mackay & Sons.

In addition to the discussion above, it

should be noted that A.J. Mackay & Sons, a partnership, is not the
name or entity which entered into the contracts sued upon and is
not the plaintiff herein.
6.

Mackay's assertions, in paragraph 14 of the Statement of

Facts, are not found in the record.

Mackay suggests, among other

things, that Okland and UDOT exercised some level of control over
the work performed by Mackay.

The record cited by Mackay, pages

49 and 112, contain no such indication that any control was
exercised over Mackay1s work.
7.

Mackay incorrectly suggests that pages 49, 50, 111, and

112 of the record indicate that Mackay was solvent, financially
responsible and posed no risk or danger.

No support for these

assertions appears, however, in the record cited by Mackay or
elsewhere.
8.

Mackay gives the false impression in paragraph 17 of the

Statement of Facts, that Okland made arrangements with Mackay in
subcontracting Mackay1 s work to give a certain "appearance" to UDOT
without UDOT knowing the true nature of the subcontract.
opposite is true.

The

All arrangements made concerning Mackay!s

subcontracts were made at the direction, request and instance of
UDOT. Furthermore, such misrepresentations are irrelevant and can
only be calculated to divert this Court's attention from the issues
12

herein.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court properly dismissed Mackay's Complaint on
several grounds.

Primarily, the dismissal was proper due to (1)

Mackay's failure to satisfy contractual conditions precedent to
this action; (2) failure state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; and

(3) failure to comply with the Utah Contractors

Licensing Act.
Mackay's Complaint was properly dismissed for failure by
Mackay to comply with the provisions of the contract sued upon and
failure to satisfy conditions precedent to this action.

The

contracts required specific notices to be given to Okland within
specified time limits in the event of any claims by Mackay of the
nature set forth in the Complaint.

The contracts also provided

that no suit may be brought without compliance with such provision.
Mackay, however, failed to give any of the required notices.
Mackay's Complaint was also properly dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted and Mackay's failure
to comply with the Utah Contractors Licensing Act. Utah Code Ann.,
Section 58-50-1, et seq. requires that no contractor may commence
or maintain an action in this state without both alleging and
proving that it was properly licensed when the contract sued upon
was entered into and when the work was performed.
13

The Complaint

of Mackay does not allege that Mackay was properly licensed at any
time. (R. 2) . Furthermore, the Utah State Division of Occupational
and Professional

Licensing has certified that Mackay was not

licensed when the contract was entered into or when the work was
performed.

(R. 36,40,98).

Mackay claims that the Contractors Licensing Act does not
apply because it contends this is not an action for compensation
under the contract since Mackay has sought arbitration.

Mackay's

argument, however, is inconsistent with its own statements in its
Brief that it brought this action for "payment for certain work
performed" and that it "now seeks compensation for such work".
(Mackay

Brief,

pp.

6,

8).

Furthermore,

Mackayfs

Complaint

specifically states that it is seeking substantial dollar amounts
from Okland.

Mackay's request for arbitration does not diminish

the fact that Mackay is seeking "payment" and "compensation" for
work performed without the required license.
Mackay also contends, for the first time on this appeal, that
the Utah Contractors Licensing Act is unconstitutional.

The

arguments now raised by Mackay should not be considered on this
appeal when they were not raised or presented to the District
Court.

Mackay claims that the Licensing Act violates the open

courts and due process provisions of the Utah Constitution because
it precludes suits by contractors which fail to comply with the
14

licensing laws.

The Licensing Act, however, satisfies all the

tests of constitutionality set forth by this Court.

Furthermore,

the statute complained of by Mackay only operates to effect Mackay
as a direct result of Mackay's own failure to comply with the law.
In any event, Mackay1s constitutional arguments are raised for the
first time on appeal and are not properly before this Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MACKAY HAS FAILED TO SATISFY EXPRESS CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
TO BRINGING THE CLAIMS NOW ASSERTED AND ITS CLAIMS HEREIN
ARE THEREFORE BARRED.
The Complaint of Mackay was properly dismissed based upon
Mackay's failure to satisfy contractual conditions precedent to the
The claims alleged in Mackay1s Complaint

claims alleged herein.

relate to additions to the agreed work, extras, and the alleged
impact of Okland!s performance on Mackayfs work on the Project.
The agreements between Mackay and Okland, however, required Mackay
to provide to Okland timely written notice as conditions precedent
to such claims.

Mackay has failed to satisfy these conditions

precedent and, therefore, the District Court properly dismissed the
Complaint of Mackay.
The agreements between Okland and Mackay contain the following
provisions

relative

to

Mackay1s

performance:
15

claims

concerning

Okland's

Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance
of any work under this contract depend wholly or
partially upon the proper workmanlike or accurate
performance of any work or materials furnished by the
Contractor or other subcontractors on the project, the
Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to
discover any such defects and report the same in writing
to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which
is so dependant; and shall allow to the Contractor a
reasonable time in which to remedy such defects; and in
the event he does not so report to the Contractor in
writing, then it shall be assumed that the Subcontractor
has fully accepted the work of others as being
satisfactory,.•(Emphasis added).
Mackay gave no notice, written or otherwise, of any defect in the
perfonaance of Okland on the project which would impact the work
of Mackay on the project. (R. 38, 100). Having failed to give the
required notice, Mackay is precluded from asserting any claim
relating to alleged deficiencies in the performance of Okland on
the Project.
The agreements between Okland and Mackay further provide that
any changes, additions or extras to the project shall be by written
amendment to the agreements and claims for extras shall be made
within one week of performing such extra work.
...any changes made in the amount of work involved, or
any other parts of this agreement, shall be by a written
amendment hereto setting forth in detail the changes
involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually
agreed upon between the Contractor and the Subcontractor
if such be possible; and if such mutual agreement is not
possible, then the value of the work shall be determined
as provided in Section 7 of this agreement.
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional
work outside the scope of this contract unless terms
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hereof shall be conclusive with respect of this agreement
between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall
be made within one week from date of completion.
Mackay gave no notice of extras within one week of completion
and no written amendment to the agreements exists with respect to
the claims asserted by Mackay herein. (R. 38, 100). Mackay has
not, and cannot, produce such written documentation because no such
documents exist. The affidavits submitted by Mackay do not allege
proper or timely notice was given. Mackayfs only support for this
contention is its attorney's own inadmissible assertion in its
memorandum to the District Court. Mackay, therefore, is precluded
from asserting such claims.
Provisions such as in this case requiring written change
orders or written notice of extra work claims are enforceable and
the contractor is not entitled to recover unless the provisions are
complied with.

Anno. 1 ALR3d 1273, 1279; See also Campbell

Building Company v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857
(1937) ; Owens v. City of Bartlett Labette County, 215 Kan. 840, 528
P.2d 1235, 1239 (1974); 13 Am.Jur.2d 24, Building, Etc. Contracts,
Section 122.
In Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons v. Magna Water, 613 P.2d 1116
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that a similar provision
"...placed the onus upon the contractor to obtain change orders or
proceed further at its own risk.11
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Id. at 1118.

Where Mackay

failed to give the required notice of its alleged claims and where
no written amendment or change order exists, Mackay is precluded
from asserting its claims for extra work.
POINT II
THE COMPLAINT OF MACKAY FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE
DISTRICT COURT.
The Complaint

of Mackay was also properly dismissed for

failure to allege sufficient facts to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under Utah law. Utah Code Ann., Section 5850-11 (1953 as amended)2, requires that no contractor may commence
or maintain any action in any Court of the State of Utah for
collection

of

compensation

for

construction

services without

alleging that he was a properly licensed contractor when the
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged cause of
action arose.
The Complaint of Mackay does not allege that Mackay was a
licensed contractor in the State of Utah as required by the Utah
Contractors Licensing Statute and, therefore, should be dismissed.
Olson v. Reese, 200 P.2d 733 (Utah
Turnbow,

114

Ariz.

408,

561

1948); B&P Concrete, Inc. v.

P.2d

329

(1977)(holding

under

The current designation of the statute is Section 58-5517.
See Footnote 1 for the various statutory designations and
enactments of the statute at issue.
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substantially identical licensing provision that failure to allege
license is alone a sufficient basis for dismissal).
POINT III
MACKAY'S COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO
OBTAIN A CONTRACTORS LICENSE AS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH
CONTRACTORS LICENSING ACT.
The Utah Contractors Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann., Section
58-50-1, et seq., requires that any person or entity acting in the
capacity of a contractor must obtain a contractor's license.
Mackay's Complaint involves claims for alleged extra work performed
as a subcontractor on a highway construction project for the State
of Utah. (R. 2). Mackay, however, was not licensed in the State
of Utah as a subcontractor at the time the agreements sued upon
were entered into or when Mackay's alleged claims arose.

(R.

36,40,98).
Utah Code Ann., Section 58-50-11 (1953 as amended) further
provides that no person or entity acting in the capacity of a
contractor without a contractors license may commence or maintain
any action

for payment with respect to work performed as a

contractor.
No contractor may act as agent or commence
or maintain any action in any court of the state
for collection of compensation for the
performance of any act for which a license is
required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed
contractor when the contract sued upon was
19

entered into and when the alleged cause of
action arose.
Mackay alleges in its Complaint that it performed work for
the

improvement

and

construction project.

construction

upon

the

subject

highway

(R. 2). Mackay, however, was not licensed

as a contractor in the State of Utah when the contract sued upon
was entered into and when the alleged cause of action arose.

(R.

36, 40, 98). Mackay did not obtain a contractor's license until
May 31, 1985.

(R. 40).

The contracts sued upon, however, were

entered into on February 1, 1984 and all work on the subject
project was completed by November of 1984.
A.

(R. 36, 98).

Mackay, As a Corporation, Was Required Under the Utah
Contractors Licensing Act to Obtain a Contractors License and
Cannot Substitute the License of a Partnership.
Numerous courts have held under similar circumstances that an

unlicensed contractor such as Mackay in this case, is precluded
from bringing an action to enfore its construction contracts.
Mackay, therefore, is barred from maintaining this action and its
Complaint was properly dismissed by the Court.

Mackay contends,

nevertheless, that the Contractors Licensing Act does not apply to

3

Meridian Corp. v McGlynnormaker Company, 567 P.2d 1110
(Utah 1977) ; State for Use of Smith v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 680
P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1984); Bernard F. Hoste, Inc. v. Kortz, 324
N.W.2d 46 (Mich.App. 1982); Dunkelberaer v. Baker, 533 P.2d 433
(Wash.App. 1975); Nickles v. Walker, 395 P.2d 679 (N.M. 1964);
Northen v. Elledae, 232 P.2d 111 (Ariz. 1951).
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it as a corporate entity because a separate entity, a partnership
known as A. J. Mackay & Sons, held a license. Mackay's contention
ignores the fundamental characteristics of a corporation.

A. J.

Mackay & Sons, a partnership, is not the same as A. J. Mackay
Company, the corporation.

Each is a separate and distinct entity

existing independent of the other. Institutional Laundry, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Commission, 706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985).

Any common

ownership or control, if any, does not alter the separateness of
the two entities. Id.
The same argument now made by Mackay was rejected in Bernard
F. Hoste, Inc. v. Kortz, 324 N.W.2d 46 (Mich.App. 1982), under the
provisions of a nearly identical statute.

In that case the

plaintiff corporation claimed that although it was not licensed,
it had substantially complied with the licensing act because the
individual owner of the corporation was licensed.

The Court,

however, rejected this argument.
In making this argument, plaintiff confuses Bernard F.
Hoste, Inc. with Bernard Hoste the individual. Although
Bernard Hoste was a licensed residential builder as an
individual prior to March 31, 1975, plaintiff was never
a licensed residential builder prior to March 28,
1977.... Bernard Hoste and plaintiff cannot be considered
the same entity for licensing purposes.
Therefore,
plaintiff was not entitled to operate without a license
during this period.
Id. at 47 (Emphasis added); See also General Insurance Company v.
Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1972).
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Mackay similarly confuses A.J. Mackay Company, the corporation,
with A.J. Mackay & Sons, the partnership.

These two entities

"cannot be considered the same entity for licensing purposes".
Section 107(c), Rules and Regulations of the Utah Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensingf specifically requires that
a corporation must obtain its own license even where individual
stockholders may be licensed:
Creation of a corporation creates a new legal person
which requires a new license even though one or more
stockholders have a contractor's license. A license held
by a stockholder cannot be authority to the corporation
to engage in contracting.
Under this regulation, the license asserted by Mackay in the name
of the A.J. Mackay & Sons partnership cannot be considered the
license of the corporation A.J. Mackay Company, the corporation.
Nickles v. Walker, 74 N.M. 546, 395 P.2d 679 (1964)(Decided under
a similar regulation and statute).

Mackay was not properly

licensed and its action herein, therefore, is precluded by the
statute.
It is significant to note that there is no indication in the
record that a license was held by any stockholder, employee, or
officer of Mackay.

Mackay only claims it was contracting, as a

corporation, under the license of a partnership.

There is no

indication in the record as to the identity of the individual
qualifier for the license Mackay subsequently obtained well after
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the Project was completed.

No qualifier at all was required for

the license held by the partnership A.J. Mackay & Sons. (Addendum).
It is further well settled that a contractor cannot substitute
another license for that required by the Contractors Licensing Act.
In Meridian Corp. v. McGlynnormaker, 567 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977),
the plaintiff contractor was duly licensed in another state but had
not been issued a Utah contractor license. The Utah Supreme Court
held that "[t]he license in another state cannot be substituted for
a license in Utah".

Id. at 1111.

Similarly, Mackay cannot

substitute the license of a partnership for the license required
of the plaintiff corporation A.J. Mackay Company.

To allow Mackay

to do so in this case would ignore the mandates of the licensing
statute and allow Mackay to contract under a partnership's license
while at the same time enjoying immunity from personal liability
behind the corporate shield of A.J. Mackay Company.
In Dunkelbercrer v. Baker, 533 P.2d 433 (Wash.App. 1975), under
a substantially identical statute, the corporate plaintiff was not
licensed. The individual owner of the corporation who had operated
the

construction

company

as

a

sole

incorporating, however, was licensed.

proprietor

prior

to

The Court, however, held

that once the corporation began operating, the individual's license
had "nothing to do with" the case.
The fact remains that the corporation as a separate
entity is attempting to prosecute a claim for
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compensation as a contractor without having taken any
steps to comply with the registration statute. This, the
corporation may not do.
Id. at 437 (Emphasis added); See also General Insurance Company v.
Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1972).
The Court denied recovery to the corporation even though the
licensed

individual

claimed

personal

responsibility

for

the

corporation's work.
B.

The Former Exceptions Developed Under the Repealed Licensing
Act Have No Application to the New Statutory Provisions
Precluding Suits By Unlicensed Contractors.
Mackay relies upon Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979),

Fillmore Products v. Western States Paving, 561 P.2d 687 (Utah
1977), and other cases for the proposition that certain exceptions
exist to the mandatory provisions of the Contractor's Licensing
Act. These cases and the exceptions, however, have no application
to the present action.

These cases and exceptions are not only

distinguishable factually, but were also decided prior to the
enactment of the current statutory provision precluding court
action by unlicensed contractors.
The cases cited by Mackay were decided under the old licensing
act, U.C.A., Section 58-23-1, repealed in 1981, which did not
contain the current provision precluding civil actions without a
proper license.

Loader v. Scott Const. Corp., 681 P.2d 1227, 1229
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(Utah 1984).

Since the former licensing act did not provide a

consequence in civil litigation for failure to obtain a license,
the Utah courts judicially adopted a general rule precluding
unlicensed contractors from recovering for contracting work.
at 1229.

Id.

The Loader decision recognized the distinction between

the former common law developed under the repealed act and the new
statutory scheme and that the status of the law under the current
statutory provsion is not the same as the former the common law.
Id. at 1229.

The former judicial exceptions, therefore, have no

application to the current legislative mandate of Section 58-5011.
Mackay contends that the legislature intended no change in the
law when it repealed the old statute and enacted the current
licensing provisions.

It is well settled, however, that when the

legislature enacts or changes a statute as it did in this case, it
is presumed that the legislature intended a change in the existing
law.

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah 1988);

Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1987); Cantwell v. Geiqer,
742 P.2d 468 (Mont. 1987); McLeod v. Chilton. 643 P.2d 712 (Ariz.
1981).
There is a strong presumption that legislatures do not
create
statutes containing provisions which are
redundant, void, inert and trivial. Furthermore, it is
presumed when a legislature alters the language of a
statute that it intended to create a change in the
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existing law.
State v. Kozlowski, 692 P.2d 316, 317 (Ariz.App. 1984).

The Utah

Legislature enacted Section 58-50-11 without enacting any provision
for exceptions.

It is presumed, therefore, that the legislature

intended to eliminate the exceptions under the repealed statute.
Mackay contends that the former common law exceptions should
be read into the new statute. Section 58-50-11, however, is clear
and unambiguous and must be read and enforced according to the
plain meaning of its provisions without regard to the previous
common law.

Epstein v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of State of

Wash., 731 P.2d 17 (Wash.App. 1987).

If the legislature intended

to create any exceptions, or to recognize the former exceptions
under the repealed statute, it could have easily added them to the
statute.
It is clear that the legislature failed to enact a
provision providing exceptions to the rule. Previous
common law rules, whatever they were, cannot create
exceptions to a clear statute.
State v. Arce, 730 P.2d 1260, 1262 n.3

(Or.App. 1986).

Such

exceptions to the clear and unambiguous language and meaning of the
statute are matters for the legislature to determine and not for
the courts.

Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449

(1967); Duckworth v. Cameron, 244 S.E.2d 217 (S.C. 1978)(Statute
precluding suit by unlicensed contractor was clear and unambiguous
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and must be applied literally).
Mackay nevertheless cites Wilderness Building Systems, Inc.
v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that the
judicial exceptions previously applied to the judicial rule barring
actions by unlicensed contractors still apply to the new statutory
mandate. The Wilderness Court, however, did not go this far. The
sole issue in that case was "whether any evidence supports the
claims of the party against whom the verdict was rendered....11
Although the Wilderness decision refers to the exceptions to the
judicial rule against recovery by unlicensed contractors, such
reference was made strictly with respect to whether there was any
evidence in the record to support the directed verdict in that
case.

The parties did not raise, and the Court did not address,

the issue in this case as to whether the former judicial exceptions
have any application to current Contractors Licensing Act.
Mackay

contends

that

since

the

Court

referred

to

the

exceptions without expressly rejecting their application under the
new statute, the Court has implicitly acknowledged the continued
effect of such exceptions.

Such implication is misconceived,

however, because to address such issue when it was not raised by
the parties and not presented to the Court would violate the policy
of the Court not to render advisory or academic opinions. Redwood
Gym v. Salt Lake Ctv. Com'n, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981).
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Where the legislature has enacted a clear mandate precluding,
without exception, suits by contractors that are not properly
licensed, the former judicial exceptions to the old rule can have
no application.

Epstein v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of State

of Wash., 731 P.2d 17 (Wash.App. 1987).

It is well settled that

the Court's "...will not judicially create an exception to the
plain statutory wording."
(Arizona 1982).

State v. Ring, 641 P.2d

862, 866

It has similarly been stated that:

...Courts are not free to construe unambiguous
legislation; they may not read language into a statute
that has not been there, particularly if it makes sense
as written.
Hansman v. Bernadillo Cty. Assessor, 625 P.2d 1214, 1217 (New
Mexico 1980); See also Grand River Dam Auth. v. State, 645 P.2d
1011 (Okla. 1982); Olando v. Prewett, 705 P.2d 593 (Mont. 1985).
In Northen v. Elledge, 72 Ariz. 166, 232 P.2d 111 (1951), the
Court denied an action by an unlicensed contractor under a similar
statute and refused to create equitable exceptions such as those
urged by Mackay.
The public policy involved here has been determined
by the legislature; it is not a subject of debate in the
courts.
It may be argued that the court should exercise its
equitable discretion and permit the plaintiff recovery
even in the face of a specific prohibition in the statute
on the ground that an unreasonable forfeiture would
result. However, the statute requiring a contractor to
possess a contractor's license before he may recover for
work done was designed for the protection of the public
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and must not be defeated in order to accommodate one who
has violated the provisions of the statute. Permitting
an unlicensed contractor to recover on the ground that
a loss would result to him otherwise would completely
nullify the statute since every unlicensed contractor
would sustain a loss or forfeiture unless he were allowed
recovery. The remedy, if any, lies with the legislature.
In State for Use of Smith v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 680 P.2d
1148 (Alaska 1984), the Court denied recovery by an unlicensed
contractor under a provision practically identical to Section 5850-11.
Public policy precludes giving this statute anything
but a literal reading.
The legislature chose the closing of the doors of
the courts as a fundamental tool to enforce its policy
of ensuring competence and financial responsibility in
those who undertake work as contractors. We are bound
to enforce the legislative policies as we find them
expressed in [the licensing statute]. Anyone engaged in
building trades must be charged with awareness of the
pervasive system of licenses and permits designed to
enhance the public safety and confidence in the industry.
Engrafting equitable exemptions onto the enforcement
policy at best aids the ignorant and gullible, whom the
legislature sought to regulate, and at worst creates
fertile fields for sharp practice.
Id. at 1157 (Emphasis in original)
The Tyonek Court also cited General Insurance Company v.
Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1972), in
which case the Court stated:
[The statute] represents a legislative determination that
the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from
engaging in the contracting business outweighs any
harshness between the parties, and that such deterrence
can best be realized by denying violators the right to
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maintain any action for compensation in the courts of the
state.
In the case at bench plaintiff corporation was not
licensed at the time it executed the contract nor at any
time during its performance. Under these circumstances,
to disregard its corporate existence would nullify that
part of the licensing law requiring a separate license
for a corporation, and to hold that plaintiff has
nevertheless substantially complied with [the statute]
requiring that it be duly licensed at all times during
the performance, would emasculate the statutory language
and nullify the section's purpose of pragmatically
enforcing the contractor's license law.
Id. at 546-47.
This

Court

has

similarly

held

that

statutes

should

be

interpreted and enforced according to their plain meaning.
We have also said that a statute should be applied
according to its literal wording unless it is
unreasonably confused or inoperable. We must assume that
each term in the statute was used advisedly by the
Legislature and that each should be interpreted and
applied according to its usually accepted meaning. Where
the ordinary meaning of the terms results in an
application that is neither unreasonably confused,
inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction to the express
purpose of the statute, it is not the duty of this Court
to assess the wisdom of the statutory scheme.
West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).
Additionally, the application of the exceptions asserted by
Mackay would clearly have a result not intended by the legislature.
Mackay contends that the statute does not apply because Mackay
subcontracted with Okland, a licensed contractor, on a project
owned by UDOT and that the statute does not protect Okland and
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UDOT.

In effect, Mackay contends that contractors can ignore the

mandatory licensing requirements of the Contractors Licensing Act
so

long

as

the

unlicensed

contractor

deals

with

licensed

contractors and government entities. Mackayfs approach would open
the floodgates of unlicensed subcontractors performing construction
work because the enforcement provision of the Licensing Act would
be rendered ineffective.

State for Use of Smith v. Tyonek Timber,

Inc. , 680 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1984); General Insurance Company v.
Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1972);
Northen v. Elledae, 72 Ariz. 166, 232 P.2d 111 (1951).
The Utah Legislature, by enacting Section

58-50-11, has

established a means of enforcing the licensing requirements by
precluding actions by contractors that are not duly and properly
licensed.

Without a legislative enactment creating exceptions to

this rule, the former judicial exceptions relied upon by Mackay
have no application to this case.

Furthermore, even if the

exceptions relied upon by Mackay still exist under the current
statute, the record is devoid of any indication that facts or
circumstances exist which would give rise to the application of
such exceptions.

Mackay's Complaint, therefore, was properly

dismissed where Mackay was not licensed when the contract sued upon
was entered into and when its claims arose.
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POINT IV
MACKAY'S COMPLAINT HEREIN IS SUBJECT TO SECTION 58-50-11
AS AN ACTION FOR COMPENSATION AND PAYMENT FOR WORK FOR
WHICH A CONTRACTORS LICENSE IS REQUIRED.
Mackay

contends that

its action herein

is not

one for

compensation for contracting work under Section 58-50-11 because
Mackay has requested the District Court to order arbitration of its
claims.

This argument unrealistically ignores the nature of

Mackay's Complaint and contradicts Mackay's own characterization
of this action.
for

which

The Complaint sets forth various alleged claims

Mackay

subcontractor

on

seeks
a

to

public

recover

for

highway

alleged

work

construction

as

a

project.

Furthermore, Mackay states in its Brief that it initiated this
action "for payment for certain work performed by Plaintiff" and
that it "now seeks compensation" for such work.

(Mackay's Brief,

pp. 6, 8).
In

Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 204 P.2d 37 (Calif.

1949), the Court rejected the argument now presented by Mackay
under a similar statute.

The Court held:

. . .application for confirmation of the arbitrator's award
and entry of the "judgment" in conformity therewith was
an "action...for collection of compensation" within the
purport of [the licensing statute].
Id. at 40.

The fact that Mackay has sought arbitration does not

diminish the fact that Mackay is seeking compensation in this
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matter.

Id. at 40.

The arbitration and award of compensation

sought by Mackay, requires an "action" in the courts under the Utah
Arbitration Act. Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-31a-l, et seq. (1985) .
Without a proper contractors license, however, Mackay is precluded
from maintaining such action.
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING WAS CORRECT AND SHOULD NOT
BE DISTURBED UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS ASSERTED
BY MACKAY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
The dismissal of Mackay's Complaint should not be disturbed
under the constitutional arguments now presented by Mackay for the
first time on appeal.
this

time

and

should

Such arguments are not properly raised at
not

be

considered.

Furthermore,

the

Contractors Licensing Act does not violate any constitutional
provisions under the standards set by this Court.

Finally, any

detriment complained of by Mackay under the statute is the direct
result of Mackay's own failure to comply with the licensing law for
a period of over six years.

Mackay cannot complain of any result

or operation of statute that occurs solely because of its own
failure to comply with the law.
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A.

Mackayfs Argument that the Contractors Licensing Act is
Unconstitutional is Raised for the First Time on this Appeal
and is Inappropriate for Review by this Court,
Mackay contends, for the first time in its Brief on appeal,

that the Contractor's Licensing Act which it failed to comply with
violates the due process provisions of the United States and Utah
State Constitutions and the open courts provisions of the Utah
State Constitution.

Mackay has not raised or argued these issues

at any time prior to this appeal. (R. 60-79,114-134).

This issue,

therefore, "is not properly before this Court since it may not be
raised for the first time on appeal".

Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d

758, 761 (Utah 1988); See Also Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev.
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983).
In Bundv v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984),
this Court Stated:
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must
present his entire case and his theory or theories of
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and
thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of
litigation.
Id. at 758. (Quoting Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d
301, 303, 470 P.2d 399 (1970)).

Mackay did not present to the

District Court any of the constitutional theories or arguments now
asserted to circumvent the clear and unambiguous provisions of the
Contractors Licensing Statute.

These issues are raised for the
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first time on this appeal and are not properly before the Court.
B.

The Utah Contractors Licensing Act Does Not Violate Mackayfs
Rights of Due Process or Access to the Courts,
Mackay suggests in its Brief that its rights of due process

and the open courts provisions of the Utah Constitution are
violated

by

the

operation

of

the

Contractors

Licensing

Act

precluding suits by contractors which are not properly licensed.
Mackay further contends that its rights are somehow violated by
"state action".

The operation of the statute in this case,

however, does not result from any action by the state or any other
entity other than Mackay itself. The sole cause of the statutes's
operation here is Mackay's own failure to obtain the required
contractors license prior to entering into the subject construction
contract.
The legislature has broad authority in enacting statutes for
the general welfare of the community.
It is well settled that in the exercise of its police
power, a state can enact regulations or laws reasonably
necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort
or general welfare of the community regardless of whether
such laws or regulations affect contracts incidentally,
directly or indirectly.
George v. Qren Ltd. & Associates. 672 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1983).
Mackay

contends

that

the

statute

cannot

operate

constitutionally without the exceptions asserted by Mackay.

If

Mackay's exceptions are read into the statute, the statute will
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have no operation or effect at all. Contractors will be left free
to ignore the licensing requirements and sue on their contracts so
long as they deal with other contractors or government entities.
In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah
1989), the Court set forth the two-part test for due process
analysis and applied this test under the open courts provision of
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution:
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative
remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of his
constitutional interest. If the legislature abrogates
one remedy, it must create another.
The benefit provided by the substitute must be
substantially equal in value or other benefit
to
the
remedy
abrogated
in
providing
essentially comparable substantive protection
to one's person, property,
or reputation,
although the form of the substitute remedy may
be different.
Second, if the legislature
substitute or alternative remedy:

fails to provide a

abrogation of the remedy or cause of action
may be justified only if there is a clear
social or economic evil to be eliminated and
the elimination of an existing legal remedy is
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for
achieving the objective.
Id. at 357-58;
Son,

See also, Sun Valley Water Beds v. Herm Hughes &

118 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29

(September

29, 1989).

The

Condemarin Court stated that the same test applies under both the
due process and open courts provisions of the constitution.
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Mackay's argument mistakenly presupposes that the statute has
"abrogated" or taken away its cause of action.

The statute,

however, does not "abrogate" Mackay's remedy, but only requires
Mackay to comply with the law as a condition precedent to bringing
an action in court.

The Act only effects actions by contractors

who fail to comply with the Act and contract illegally. As pointed
out above, any loss of remedy, is caused solely by Mackay's own
failure to comply with the Contractors Licensing Statute.

In any

event, the first prong of the open courts test is satisfied because
the Contractors Licensing Act does afford Mackay an alternative
remedy.

The alternative provided is simply to comply with the

Act's licensing requirements.

The right of access to the courts

is in no way impaired for contractors who comply with the law.
Assuming arguendo, that the first test is not met, the second
part of the test is satisfied. The statute is aimed at the purpose
of regulating contractors and protecting the.public from inept and
financially irresponsible contractors.
enforcing

the

licensing

requirement

Furthermore, the means of
is

not

arbitrary

or

unreasonable because all the contractor needs to do to bring an
action in the courts is to properly comply with the licensing
requirements.

Mackay has not made any showing to the contrary.

It cannot rationally be said that a statute which does nothing more
than require compliance with the law is arbitrary or unreasonable.
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The fact that the statute does not affect a contractor's right
to bring or maintain an action in the courts unless the contractor
fails to be properly licensed and contracts illegally, is of
additional significance to the constitutional analysis.

Mackay

cannot complain of the operation of the statute when it only
operates as a result of Mackay's own failure to comply with the
law.

Since the Act only affects the contractor's rights when he

fails to comply with the licensing requirements of the Act, the
analysis should not be on the provision precluding court action but
rather on the licensing requirements themselves.

It is the

licensing requirements which, when not complied with, trigger the
provisions precluding suits by illegal contractors. Mackay has not
suggested,

however,

that

the

licensing

requirements

are

unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Mackayfs Complaint was properly dismissed where Mackay did not
satisfy the express conditions precedent to bringing its action.
The contracts required specific notices to be given to Okland
within specified time limits in the event of any claims by Mackay
of the nature set forth in the Complaint.

The contracts also

provided that no suit may be brought without compliance with such
provisions.

Mackay, however, failed to give any of the required

notices.
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The Complaint of Mackay does not allege that Mackay had a
license at any time and, therefore, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted,

Mackay's action herein was also

properly dismissed due to the fact that Mackay was not licensed
when the contract sued upon was entered into and performed as
required by the Utah Contractors Licensing Act.
The Contractors Licensing Act fully applies to Mackayfs action
herein for payment and compensation for work allegedly performed
as an unlicensed contractor.
Mackay's constitutional arguments are raised for the first
time on appeal and are not properly considered on this appeal.
Furthermore, the Utah Contractors Licensing Act does not violate
any provision of the Utah or Federal constitutions. Mackay has no
standing to complain of the operation of the Licensing Act when
such operation is only triggered by Mackay's own failure to comply
with the Licensing Act.

The Licensing Act meets all tests of

constitutionality.
Dated this

day of March, 1990.
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused four true and correct copies of the
foregoing to be mailed, United States Mail, first class, postage
prepaid, to the following this

day of March, 1990:

Robert F. Babcock, Esq.
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South, #200

Salt Lake City, Utah

84101

f4n\r JFPT4k
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ADDENDUM
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Robert F. Babcock (#0158)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC. ,

:

COMPLAINT

:

Civil No.

Defendant.
Plaintiff, for cause of action against Defendant, alleges as
follows:
1.
the

Plaintiff is a corporation authorized and existing under

laws of

the

State

of Utah

having

its principal

place of

business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.
the

Defendant is a corporation authorized and existing under

laws of the State of Utah and being

located

in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah.
3.

Plaintiff

construction

and Defendant entered

services

Transportation

Project

as

part

No.

of

the

into an agreement for
Utah

1-215-9(72)10,

Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East.

Department
West

of

of

Little

4.

Pursuant to said agreement, Defendant agreed to pay the

sum of approximately $730,000. plus or minus the reasonable value
of any work added to or deleted from the project.
5.

Plaintiff

has

duly

performed

all

of

the

terms

and

conditions required of it under said agreement.
6.

Defendant

has

failed

to perform

pursuant

to the said

agreement and has breached the same by:
(a)

failing to pay a sum exceeding $240,000. which is due

and

owing

Plaintiff

by

Defendant

after

all

changes

and

credits have been added and deducted together with interest
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum;
(b)

causing Plaintiff damages for loss of efficiency in an

amount

exceeding

$240,000.

by

using

improper

contract

management procedures;
(c)

causing

determined

damage

at

the

to

Plaintiff

hearing

of

this

in

an

matter

amount
by

to

be

failing

to

properly perform its duties and responsibilities as the prime
contractor on the project;
(d)

causing

determined

damage

at

the

to

Plaintiff

hearing

of

this

in

an

matter

amount
by

to

be

wrongfully

requiring extra work and duties of the Plaintiff;
(e)

causing Plaintiff a loss of overhead and profit in an

amount to be determined

at the hearing of this matte as a

result of the aforesaid breaches of the agreement.
7.
that

any

Section 7 of the agreements entitled Disputes, provides
dispute

concerning

matters
-2-

in connection

with

these

agreements, and without the scope of the work, then such dispute
shall be settled by a ruling board of arbitration.
8.

Demand

for arbitration was made upon Defendant on or

about December 27, 1987, in writing.

Defendant has failed and

refused to enter into arbitration as required by the terms and
conditions of the agreement.
9.
render

By reason of the failure and refusal of Defendant to
payment

of

the

sums

due

Plaintiff,

and

to enter

into

arbitration under the terms and conditions of the Contract, it has
been necessary for the Plaintiff to secure services of an attorney
to represent it in this action.

Defendant should be required to

pay Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendant as
follows:
1.
the

For an order that the Defendant be required to submit

matter

to

arbitration

in

accordance

with

the

terms

and

conditions of the contract and the Utah Arbitration Act.
2.

For Plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in this matter,

3.

For

Plaintiff's

costs

of

Court

and

such

other

and

further relief as the Court deems proper in the premises.
DATED this 2f

day of December, 1988.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

BV: e^+MJuJ?
Robert F. Babcock
Plaintiff's Address:
350 West Hartwell Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
10-3-ajmacoak.cpl
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DISTRICT COURT COVER SHEET

DEFENDANTS

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC,

(b) ATTORNEYS (Attorney name,
Bar I. Address & Telephone #)
Robert F. Babcock #0158
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 531-7000

ATTORNEY (If known)

II.

NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in appropriate category)
CIVIL

DOMESTIC
DA Divorce/Annulment

AA Administrative Agency
AP Appeal

SM Separate Maintenance

CV Other Civil

PA Paternity
XXX

SA Spouse Abuse
UR URESA Action

CN Contract
CS Custody and Support
HC Writ-Habeas Corpus
PD Property Damage

PROBATE
ES Estate

PI Personal Injury

GC Guardian/Conservator

PR Property Rights (Real)

NC Name Change
MISCELLANEOUS

OT Other Probate

MI Miscellaneous
ABSTRACTS
AJ Abstract of Judgment

MH Mental Health

TL Tax Lien
ADOPTIONS
AD Adoption

III.

JURY DEMAND:
( ) YES

MENTAL HEALTH

<XJ*

N0

WILFORD A. BEESLEY
STANFORD P. FITTS
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
3 00 Deseret Book Building
4 0 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A. J. MACKAY COMPANY,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD T. LINDBERG

:

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., :
Defendant.

Civil No. C88-8250
Judge James S. Sawaya

:

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant,

Richard

T.

Lindberg,

having

been

duly

sworn,

deposes and says:
1.

On or about February 1, 1984, plaintiff A. J. Mackay

Company

("Mackay"), as subcontractor, entered into subcontract

agreements with Okland, as general contractor, relating to Utah
Department of Transportation project number 1-215-9(72)10, West
of Little Cottonwood Creek to West of 13 00 East.

The work on

this project was completed in November of 1984.
2.

On or about December

28, 1988, Mackay

served upon

Okland its Complaint seeking arbitration of claims for payment
for certain work allegedly performed by Plaintiff under the above
1

agreements.
3.

All damages claimed by Mackay, if any, against Okland

result from acts of the Utah State Department of Transportation
("UDOT"), and not of Okland, and all such claims pass through to
UDOT and would be the subject of third-party claims by Okland
against UDOT.
4.

The agreement between UDOT and Okland for construction

of the above referenced project does not provide for resolution
of disputes by arbitration.
5.

The granting of arbitration for resolving the issues and

claims of plaintiff Mackay would result in duplicate proceedings
and multiplicity of lawsuits between Mackay, Okland and UDOT.
6.

UDOT

has

indicated

to

Okland

that

it

will

not

participate in any arbitration of Mackay's claims.
7.

Mackay

has

submitted

its

claims

on

the

subject

construction project directly to UDOT through Okland and, over a
period of four years, has participated in negotiations with UDOT
concerning such claims.
8.

The negotiations between Mackay, UDOT and Okland are

without resolution pending documentation from Mackay to resolve
UDOT

concerns

regarding

Mackay's

claims,

including

primarily

concerns that Mackay1s claims are the result of not adequately
managing its work forces.
9.

Mackay has not provided any response or documentation

regarding the concerns of UDOT and Okland concerning Mackay1s
2

claims despite repeated requests over a period of more than four
years,
10.

UDOT has withheld $48,600.00 from Okland as liquidated

damages on the subject project due to failure of Mackay to timely
complete its work,

Okland has not withheld any amounts from

Mackay under its agreements on the project,
11.

Okland has

sought, over the past four years, the

cooperation of Mackay

in pursuing their claims against UDOT,

including

relating

information

to UDOT

concerns

that Mackay

failed to adequately man its work forces, but Mackay has not
provided such cooperation or information.
12.

Mackay has not provided any written notice of alleged

deficiencies in Okland's work impacting the work of Mackay and
has given no written notice of additional or extra work within
one week of completion of the work.

No written addendum to the

agregaaajjts exist relative to the claims of Mackay.

1989.
My Commission Expires:
Notary Public
Residing at:__
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this ^jfe day of
January, 1989:
Robert F. Babcock, Esq.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing

Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
William E.Dunn

Heber M. Wells Build.ng
16 0 E a s t 3 0 0

Executive Director
David E. Robinson
Division Dirmnr

South/P.O. Box 45802

S a , t L a k e c,t

Y- u t a h 84145-0802
801 -530-6628

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS

THIS IS 1 0 CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained
by i he U t ah SI a t e D i. \/ i -> i on o f Occupa t i ona 1 and P rof e s s i. ona 1 L i cens ing ,
repeals whether- an official contractors

license has ewer been issued to:

A. J. Mack ay Company, a corporation, and whether such license, if any, is
c ur r cn t o r ha s e x p i red .

It is hereby certified that license no. 39131--S was issued by this office
for said

licensee on May 31, 1985 with the classifications

£ ncj j n e e r i r ig a r id 3 0 3 0 D e mo 1 i. 11 o n & 1A) r e c k i ng .

t FURTHER CERTIFY

S a id

1100 General

1 i c e n s e is current.

that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by

virtue of Title 58 U . C . H .

1953,

as amended, and that I am the legal keeper

and custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah State Division of
Occupational

and Professional Licensing and if such records do exist anywhere

they would be in my control and possession.

This certificate

is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in

compliance with RULE '14(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Ii\i WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 29th. day of
December, 198 8.

George P. Wei ler, License Coord ihUTHTr
OJtah State Division of Occupational
and Profess ional Licens ing

EXHIBIT'S"

WILFORD A. BEESLEY
STANFORD P. FITTS
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
300 Deseret Book Building
4 0 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 53 8-2100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A. J. MACKAY COMPANY,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
R. BEN NILSEN

:

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., :
Defendant.

Civil No. C88-8250
Judge James S. Sawaya

:

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant, R. Ben Nilsen, having been duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

I

was

the

project

manager

for

Okland

Construction

Company, Inc. ("Okland") on the Utah Department of Transportation
project number 1-215-9(72)10, West of Little Cottonwood Creek to
West of 1300 East.
November

of

1984.

The work on this project was completed in
I have

personal knowledge of the matters

stated herein.
2.

Richard T. Lindberg is the Secretary/Treasurer of Okland

Construction Company.
3.

On or about February
I

1, 1984 A. J.

Mackay

Company

("Mackay") entered

into subcontract agreements with Okland

for

work on the project.
4.

Mackay has not presented any claims to Okland other than

claims which Mackay claimed result from acts of the Utah State
Department

of Transportation

("UDOT"),

and not of Okland, and

which Mackay presented to be passed through to UDOT.
5.

If Okland is forced to arbitrate Mackay's claims and an

arbitration award is made against Okland, Okland will then file a
lawsuit against UDOT to recover the amounts awarded to Mackay in
the arbitration.
6.

UDOT

has

indicated

to

Okland

that

it

will

not

participate in any arbitration of Mackay's claims.
7.

Mackay

has

submitted

its

claims

on

the

subject

construction project directly to UDOT through Okland and, over a
period of four years, has participated in negotiations with UDOT
concerning such claims.
8.
not

been

The negotiations between Mackay, UDOT and Okland have
finished

documentation
Mackay's

and

claims,

because

Okland

and

UDOT

are

responses

regarding

UDOT

including

primarily

concerns

waiting

concerns
that

for

regarding
Mackay's

claims are the result of not adequately manning and equiping its
work forces.
9.
regarding

Mackay has not provided any response or documentation
the concerns of UDOT and Okland

concerning

Mackay's

claims despite repeated requests over a period of more than four
2

years.
10.

UDOT has withheld $48,600.00 from Okland as liquidated

damages on the UDOT project due to failure of Mackay to timely
complete

its work.

Okland has not withheld

any

amounts

from

Mackay under its agreements on the project.
11.

Okland

has

sought,

over

the

past

four

years,

the

cooperation of Mackay in pursuing Mackay's claims against UDOT,
including
failed

information

relating

to adequately

man

to

its work

UDOT

concerns

that

forces, but Mackay

Mackay
has not

provided such cooperation or information.
12.

Mackay has not provided any written notice of claimed

deficiencies

in Okland's work affecting Mackay's

work and

has

given no written notice of additional or extra work within one
week

of

addendum

completion
to

the

of

the

agreements

claimed
exist

extra
relative

work.
to

No

the

written

claims

of

Mackay.
13.

The water

problems which

Mackay

claims delayed

project were the result of site conditions differing
plans and specifications prepared by UDOT.

the

from the

Mackay admits that

the State of Utah should pay for these claims concerning excess
water on the job.
14.

Okland

has

fully

satisfied

and

completed

all

its

obligations to Mackay under the subject agreements and has paid
to Mackay all retention funds and amounts due thereunder.
16.

Okland did not intend that the arbitration language in
3

the subject agreements would apply to claims presented to Okland
to be passed through to UDOT.
17.
through

Mackay did not notify Okland of any claims not passing
to

the

State

of

Utah

until

the

initiation

of

this

lawsuit.
18.

All claims presented to Okland by Mackay prior to the

initiation of this lawsuit were claims which Mackay presented to
Okland so Okland could pass them through to UDOT and which Mackay
claimed should be paid by the State of Utah.
was received
19.

from Mackay regarding

The attached letter

its claims on the project.

The discussions between Mackay, Okland and UDOT have

been sporadic because Mackay's has not provided any documentation
or

response

Mackay

to

failed

engineer's

UDOT
to

or

Okland

adequately

reports

indicate

regarding
man

his

that

UDOT's

work.

Mackay

concern
UDOT's

failed

to

that
daily

provide

sufficient personnel on the job to prosecute its work.

Mackay

has not given any explanation for these records.
20.
drivers

UDOT
where

has
not

expressed

working

indicated

that Mackay's

direction

other

than

a

in

an

concern

efficient

trucks were

toward

that

leaving

the designated

Mackay's

manner.

Reports

the project
dump

truck

site.

in a
Duane

Christensen, UDOT engineer reported to Okland that he followed
one

Mackay

truck

leaving

the

job-site

at

approximately

6400

South, that the truck drove up to the avenues, stopped at an
apartment and returned two hours later to the job-site with the
4

same load it left with.

R. Ben Nilsen

Subscribed

and

sworn

to

before

me

this
Lis

/ S ^ * day

of

February, 1989.
My Commission Expires:

v

I

1 -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

certify

that

I caused

a true and

correct

foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this
February, 1989:
Robert F. Babcock, Esq.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

~^-V

5

copy

of the

/,^*-day of

A. J. MftCKftY COMPANY
3435 WEST 900 SOUTH
SftLT LAKE CITY, UTAH

93104

November 13, 1984

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION
Post Office Box 15448
1978 South West Temple
Salt Lake Ctty, UT
84115
Attention:
RE:

Ben Nilsen

1-215-3(72)10

Dear Ben:
I have pat together a list of items that I feel should be
paid for by the State of Utah.
Before getting to the
specific items, I would like to outline a few guidelines
which pertain to the assessment of the various costs.
Whenever possible, an extra will be related to an existing
item in the original contract and the rate for that item
will be used, e.g. item A. under the section for excess
water pertains to the mass excavation which has a rate of
$3.00/ cubic yard.
Otherwise, the cost will be figured
according to the U.D.0.T guidelines which allow:
A. With respect to labor costs, the actual per hour
cost will have an additional 3 0 * factor to cover
administrative overhead, taxes, and benefits. According to
this formula, an excavator operator should be figured at
$38.59/hour, a 1©—wheel dump truck driver at $25.53/hour, a
semi end—dump driver at $25-73/hour, and a general laborer
at $18.02/hour.
B. With respect to materials costs, the actual cost
will have an additional 15% factor to cover administrative
overhead.
C. With respect to equipment costs, the rates are
outlined in an equipment rental blue book which allows
$129.15 for a 235 excavator, $77.95 for a 225 excavator,
$46.63 for a 10—wheel dump truck, and $65.48 for a semi enddump truck.

With these guidelines understood, the following items are
directly related to the problem of excess water on the site.
A. There was 2 5 % extra production required on 87,590
cubic yards of supei—saturated material.
This converts to
21,898 cubic yards <? $3. 00/cu. yd. , or $65,692.96,
BRouting the water in the bottom of the excavation
project required 105 hours of 235 excavator with operator (?
$159.74/hour, or $16,772.70.
C.
Regrading the slopes and bottom of the excavation
project due to excess water required 60 hours of 235
excavator with operator (? $159.74/hour, or $9,584.40.
D.
Road construction as follows:
1583 cubic yards
hauled into the site and then left to be used by W. W. Clyde
after we left the project; and 458 cubic yards hauled into
the site and then hauled out.
At the rate of $3.00/cubic
yard, the cost figures to 1583 cubic yards i? $3.00 and 458
cubic yards £ $6.00, or $7,497.00.
E.
When the 12" wire baskets were placed under the
flume, the wet condition of the slopes necessitated the use
of extra cobble rock at the toe of the slopes to keep the
baskets in place.
122 cubic yards were used at a cost of
$9.11/cubic yard, or $1,111.42.
In addition, this operation
required 12 hours of 10—wheel dump truck and driver <?
$72.16/hour, or $865.92, and 4 hours of 235 excavator with
operator & $159.74/hour, or $638.96.
The total cost for
this item is $2616.30.
F.
When the ditches were dug for the drainage pipe,
the excess water from the banks necessitated an overexcavation of the 12" and 66" ditches. The 12" excavation
amounted to 464 cubic yards and the 66" excavation amounted
to 624 cubic yards.
With an allowance of $3.00 for the
excavation and $8.00 for the additional material needed for
backfill, this item amounts to $11,968.00.
In addition to the extras due to excess uater conditions,
there 3L^G also extra items with respect to the excavation.
ft. Concerning the E and F ramps, even though the
excavation of these ramps is accounted for in the crosssectioning of the mass excavation, we were directed by
U.D.0.T. officials to extend our grading of these ramps
beyond the mass excavation boundaries to facilitate the
laying of forthcoming pipe.
This involved 2664 cubic yards
& $3. 00/cu. yd. , or $7,992.00.
B. The hauling of the weigh slab consisted of 152
cubic yards which required 28.5 hours of 10-wheel dump truck

eartd driver <? $72. 16 and dump fees for 19 loads <?
$20-00/load.
These two factors total $2436.56.
C. The hauling of flood control concrete consisted of
240 cubic yards which required 45 hours of 10-wheel dump
truck and driver (? $72. 16 and dump fees for 30 loads <?
$20-00/load.
These two factors total $3847.20.
D.
The hauling of concrete to the Magna Landfill due
to its refusal at the Golf Course required 25 hours of semi
end-dump truck and driver <? $91.21/hr and dump fees for 25
loads <? $20.00/load.
These two factors total $2780.25.
E.
We had to increase our haul route due to the
elimination of the culvert on 6400 South and the extra
hauling time amounted to 33% over 7406 cubic yards of
material.
This translates to $1.00 extra per cubic yard, or
$7, 406. 00.
Lastly, there are several items which should be addressed
the an^^ai of the Gabian Baskets aspect of the project.

in

A. With respect to the creek banks, we believe an
ovei—excavation occurred when the creek was widened beyond
the amount specified to place the gabian baskets.
This
amounted to 3111 cubic yards (? $3.00/cu.yd., or $3,333.00.
B. With respect to the creek bed, an ovei—excavation
of 1111 cubic yards occurred when we had to deepen the creek
bed to accomodate the grade specified for the loose riprap.
This amounts to $3,333.00.
C. Concerning the "public relations" work we did to
appease the various homeowners whose property borders the
creek, 40 hours of 225 excavator and operator were required
@ $108.54/hour as well as 80 hours of general labor 9
$18-02/hour.
These two items total $5783.20.
We have tried to be as comprehensive and responsible as
possible in our preparation of these figures.
Don't
hesitate to contact us if we can be of any further
assistance.

Sincerely,

John Henry McCaughey
A. J. MACKPY CO.

Third JiiOicsn i..\oinct
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WILFORD A. BEESLEY
STANFORD P. FITTS
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
3 00 Deseret Book Building
4 0 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A. J. MACKAY COMPANY,

:

Plaintiff,

ORDER

:

vs.

:

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., :
Defendant.
Defendant

Civil No. C88-8250
Judge James S. Sawaya

:

Okland

Construction

Company,

Inc's

Motion

for

Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
to Compel Arbitration and Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's
Counterclaims

came

on

regularly

for hearing

before

the

above

entitled Court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, on March
13, 1989.
A.

Defendant was represented by counsel of record, Wilford

Beesley,

Esq.

and

Stanford

P.

Fitts, Esq.

Plaintiff

represented by counsel of record Robert F. Babcock, Esq.

was

The Court

having reviewed the memoranda submitted and heard the arguments of
counsel for the parties and being fully advised in the premises,

1

HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's

Arbitration

and

Motion

for

Plaintiff's

Summary

Motion

to

Judgment
Dismiss

to

Compel

Defendant's

Counterclaims are denied.
2.

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted

and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.
from

maintaining

its

action

by

the

Plaintiff is precluded
provisions

of

the

Utah

Contractors Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann., Sections 58-50-1, et
seq.
Dated this ^tf

day of March, 1989.
BY THE-SCOURT

Jamesr^ s. Sawav^/
"District Court: Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

certify

that I caused

a true and

correct copy

foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this ^ 3
March, 1989:
Robert F. Babcock, Esq.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-sl.|> JR=*sr4U

of the
day of

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
I Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

David L. Buhler
Executive Director

David E. Robinson
Division Director

Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South/P 0 Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802
(801)530-6628

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained
by the Utah State Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing,
reveals whether an official contractors license has ever been issued to:
A. J. MACKAY & SONS, and whether such license, if any, is current or has
expired.

It is hereby certified that license no. 68049 was issued by this office
for said licensee on October 11, 1959 as a partnership with the
classifications Al General Engineering and C34 Wrecking and Demolition.

At

the time of issue, no qualifier or any written examinations were required to
obtain a contractors license.

Said license lapsed April 30. 1985.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by
virtue of Title 58 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and that I am the legal keeper
and custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah State Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such records do exist anywhere
they would be in my control and possession.
This certificate is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in
compliance with RULE 44(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 20th. day of
February, 1990.

SEAL

George P. Weiler, License Coordinator
UtsiK State Division of Occupational
aoa Professional Licensing

